Contant v. Lindsay by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-30-2012 
Contant v. Lindsay 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Contant v. Lindsay" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1218. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1218 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
ALD-136       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-4409 
 ___________ 
 
ISAN CONTANT,  
                                            Appellant 
v. 
 
CAMERON LINDSAY, Warden, 
Moshannon Valley Correctional Center 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-00204) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson  
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on a Motion for Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 22, 2012 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit 
  
Judges 
(Opinion filed: March 30, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Isan Contant appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania that denied his petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
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§ 2241.  We will dismiss the appeal as moot. 
 Contant’s § 2241 petition challenged the calculation of his criminal sentence by 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).  Contant alleged that the BOP should have 
credited his criminal sentence for time spent in custody of the Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).  In response, the respondents indicated that the United 
States Attorney’s Office had contacted the BOP, and that the BOP had determined that 
Contant was entitled to 8 days of credit against his criminal sentence.  The respondents 
explained that the additional 36 days of credit that Contant requested were not warranted, 
because that time frame was prior to the date when ICE referred Contant for criminal 
prosecution.  The Magistrate Judge assigned to the case recommended that the District 
Court dismiss the petition as moot with regard to the 8 days that Contant had been 
credited, and that the Court deny the petition with respect to the request for the remaining 
days of credit.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation, and additionally held that Contant’s petition should be denied because 
he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 
 Contant filed a timely notice of appeal.  Several days later, Contant satisfied his 
sentence and was released from BOP custody to ICE custody.1
                                                 
1 Contant was removed to Trinidad and Tobago on February 8, 2012.  See Motion to 
Dismiss, Contant v. Holder, No. 12-1479, filed March 8, 2012. 
  Appellees then filed a 
motion for summary action, arguing that we should dismiss the appeal as moot or, in the 
alternative, affirm the District Court’s order denying Contant’s habeas petition.  Contant 
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argues that the appeal is not moot, because he intends to “file an action pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and/or an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents
 In order to exercise jurisdiction over this appeal, we must assure ourselves that the 
appeal raises an Article III § 2 case or controversy.  
, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971), so that he can recover monetary damages for his wrongful 
imprisonment” for 36 days.  He also argues that the appeal raises substantial questions 
regarding the District Court’s denial of his petition. 
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 
(1998).  When a habeas petitioner’s sentence has expired, he must demonstrate that some 
“collateral consequence” of the conviction still exists to show that a case or controversy 
continues.  Id.  If an appellant is attacking an expired sentence, “collateral consequences 
will not be presumed, but must be proven.”  Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 148 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Cottman, 142 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 1998)).  The 
Supreme Court has indicated that one may establish collateral consequences only when 
there is a likelihood that a favorable decision would redress the injury or wrong.  Burkey, 
556 F.3d at 148 (citing Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) and 
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)).  In his § 2241 petition, Contant sought credit 
against his criminal sentence; he did not attack his conviction in any way.  As he has 
finished serving his sentence, a favorable decision here would not afford him the relief 
that he sought.  Although Contant argues that he intends to file a civil rights complaint 
for monetary damages, such an allegation does not constitute the type of continuing 
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injury that is sufficient for mootness purposes.2  See Okereke v. United States
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal.  The order of the District 
Court entered November 23, 2011 will be vacated and the matter remanded to the District 
Court, with instructions to dismiss the habeas petition as moot. 
 , 307 F.3d 
117, 121 (3d Cir. 2002) (appellant must demonstrate that he has suffered or is threatened 
with actual injury traceable to district court's decision that can be redressed by favorable 
decision in appellate court). 
See United States v. 
Munsingwear, Inc.
 
, 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950). 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
2 It appears that if Contant were to file a civil rights lawsuit to contest the length of his 
sentence, such suit would be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  See 
Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177-78 (3d Cir. 2006) (Heck’s favorable-
termination requirement applies and civil rights lawsuit not available to litigant for whom 
habeas relief is no longer available); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(same).  However, even if Contant’s appeal were not moot, we would affirm the District 
Court’s holding on the merits, as we do not believe that he was in “official detention” 
until ICE officials requested that he be prosecuted.  Contant thus would not be able to 
fulfill the favorable-termination requirement. 
